One of intriguing aspects of African Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) is the extent of multi-membership, where many Africa countries are members of more than one RTA. Using a gravity model for 25 countries and the years 1980-2006 we measure the extent of multi-membership and compare its impact in two major African Regional blocs, ECOWAS and SADC. We find that the impact of multi-membership critically depends on the characteristics of the multi-membership of regional integration initiatives. We find a positive impact if an additional membership complements the integration process of the original regional integration initiative: overlapping memberships had a much stronger and significant positive effect on bilateral trade within ECOWAS compare to an insignificant impact within SADC.
Introduction
Trade by and between Sub-Saharan African Countries is an important and versatile research topic for at least two reasons. Firstly, the potential contribution of regional trade agreements (RTAs) in Africa has been contested both on theoretical and empirical grounds. In a nutshell the arguments are that (a) similarities of comparative advantages and structural supply side characteristics imply that African RTAs will have a smaller contribution to bilateral trade flows compared to North-South RTAs and (b) that the 'spaghetti bowl' of African regional economic integration (REI) schemes mainly creates red tape and inconsistencies that actually hamper intra-regional trade (ECA, 2004 , p.41, Chacha, 2013 ). An extensive econometric investigation using a metaanalysis refutes the former argument (a) and shows that some of the RTAs have made some positive gains while others have realised a disappointing performance (Afesorgbor, 2013) . However, (b) has not seen much extensive research. This article provides nuance for the latter argument by showing that multi-RTA membership actually strengthens intra-regional trade if the additional membership of other RTAs complements the integration process of the original RTA.
Secondly, economic integration in Africa is interesting from a research point of view, because the continent has a very high density and diversity of REIs.
According to Yang and Gustav (2005, p.5) , RTAs have been proliferating exponentially and Africa has now a dense web of RTAs. This implies that a lot of variation exists both across countries and across RTAs. The high density and diversity has led to an intriguing multi-membership, where many African countries are members of several different REIs. Out of the total number of 53 African countries, 47 are members of more than one RTA and only 6 maintain single membership of just one RTA (ECA, 2004) . This stylized fact offers an intriguing puzzle and illustrates that Africa provides a unique testing ground for alternative theories on the impact of (multiple) RTA membership.
This article contributes to the literature by measuring multi-membership in two major African REIs and comparing how the effect of multi-membership differs in these two regional blocs: the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) 3 and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC (Söderbaum, 1994) . This paper provides a novelty from both the empirical and theoretical perspectives. Empirically, it is the first paper to the best of our knowledge that 4 measures and compares the trade impact of overlapping (multi) membership in economic integration using the international trade empirical workhorse, the gravity model. Additionally, in an approach very different from Chacha 1 (2013), we define multi-membership as a count of RTAs that a country-pair are both members of, in contrast to Chacha that measures multi-membership at the RTA level. Theoretically, we also question the assertion of only looking at multi-membership of RTAs as complication and duplication by also considering the possibility that some of the RTAs can be complementary. The empirical findings support our theoretical reasoning that the impact of multi REI-membership critically depends on the characteristics of the overlapping RTA. In particular we find a positive impact if additional membership complements the integration process of the original REI:
overlapping memberships had a significant positive effect on bilateral trade within the ECOWAS bloc but it is insignificant for SADC.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 offers a snapshot of the African REI spaghetti bowl in 2010 and multi-membership in ECOWAS and SADC in particular. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that deals with multi-memberships in RTAs. Section 3 introduces our tool of analysis (the gravity model) and our data set and motivates our methodological choices and empirical operationalization. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 5 draws conclusions and policy implications.
The spaghetti bowl of African regional integration initiatives
History shows that regional integration in Africa has been a process of trial and error in negotiations that were often fraught by political difficulties and followed up by renewed efforts (Ezenwe, 1983; Soderbaum, 1996; Herman et al. 2011) . As a consequence of the many initiatives and different fortunes of regional integration initiatives, the African landscape is complex to say the least with many REIs and intersecting memberships of the many regional blocs. The rising wave of regionalism on the continent gives credence to Bhagwati and Panagariya (1999) 1 Chacha (2013) is the only study that empirically looked at regional integration and challenge of overlapping membership on trade. 5 coined term "spaghetti bowl" of RTAs on the world. The Africa version of the crisscrossing RTAs described by Yang and Gupta (2005) This simple stylized fact provides underpinnings for the thought that the impact of multi-membership may differ for different regional blocs. Source: Authors' computation based on the DoTs.
Overlapping multi-RTA membership
Generally speaking, multi-membership in RTAs is not a new phenomenon (for example the Benelux -a free trade agreement between Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands -continued to exist alongside the European Economic Community).
Typically, however, multi-membership is seen as a problem creating inconsistencies that challenge effective economic integration. Many authors such as Gunning (2001), Yang and Gupta (2005) , Mwangi and Kuhlmann (2012) Although all these studies claim that multi-membership may limit the potential of these regional blocs to stimulate intra-regional trade, only Chacha (2013) provides empirical evidence to substantiate this claim. Chacha indicates that a one unit of overlap frequency ratio is associated with a reduction in intra-RTA trade by 0.73% points. Indeed, differences in the rules of origin (RoO) may undermine the effectiveness of the RTAs by creating inconsistent red tape. Also overlapping and multiple memberships may undercut member states' commitment which is a necessary condition for the success of any RTA.
Likewise, it is equally possible that multi-membership offers benefits to countries. Lyakurwa et al. (1997) argue that overlapping membership in the form of a large group within which there are small sub-groups may lead to progress in the African context. These benefits can consist of economic benefits, of economic spillovers from non-economic (aspects of) treaties and of non-economic benefits from economic treaties. As to the economic benefits of RTAs, Cheng et al (2009, p. 45) define overlapping membership as a phenomenon whereby one country is involved in more than one RTA. They refer to overlapping membership as a hub and spokes system with the individual country as the hub and the other countries with which it has an overlapping RTA as the spokes. In the context of increasing bilateralism, the hub country through multi RTA membership reduces the probability of becoming the victim of trade discrimination from the spokes that are non-members of the hub's original RTA. Theoretically, we look at multi-membership as an instrument to minimize economic vulnerability to protectionist measures, to maximize economic spill-overs from other regional diplomatic arrangements that differ with respect to the noneconomic issues that they cover and to maximize non-economic benefits in particular if geographic coverage is important.
De Groot et al (2004) find that differences in formal institutional quality play a key role in determining the nature of trade flows. REIs that achieve homogeneous institutional factors (umbrella REIs) can thus be expected to have a stronger impact on intra-REI-trade than REIs that do not achieve homogeneity (competing REIs). So in analysing the impact of overlapping memberships in ECOWAS and SADC, there are two main issues (see Figure 2) . ECOWAS member states belong to two other sub-regional groupings WAEMU and WAMZ. These blocs are recognized as appendages of ECOWAS working to achieve ECOWAS' overall objective. Additionally, the other regional groupings are not major regional blocs that can compete with ECOWAS. There is growing rapport between ECOWAS and WAEMU in the design of common programme of action on trade liberalisation. They have agreed on common RoO, custom declaration forms and compensation mechanisms (ECA, 2004; ECA, 2012) . Typically multi-membership in the case of ECOWAS is not problematic. This can be contrasted to SADC, whose member states share membership with other important regional blocs such as COMESA, ECCAS and EAC and the majority of the members of these regional blocks are non-SADC members, so that conflicts of interests can occur and major differences in institutions are likely to persist. In support of complication of multi-membership between SADC and COMESA, Brenton and Isik (2012) pinpoint that set of rules of origin governing the trade preferences of two regional blocs are totally different. Therefore, overlapping membership may exert a negative impact or may not increase trade among members significantly.
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In the next sections we will address these issues empirically controlling for other factors in order to distil the marginal impact of multi-membership in ECOWAS and SADC.
Empirical Design and Data
The design of our econometric investigation is traditional as we use the well-known gravity equation as our main tool (Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010) We use the remoteness index as proxy for MRT just as similarly used in Wei (1996) ( ) are the exporter and importer MTR. is the bilateral trade cost between countries.
The set of the countries that we analyse (See Appendix 1) reflects that we want to include all member states of the two major African trading agreements. We study ECOWAS and SADC because we want to analyse groups of countries that are involved in RTAs and where multi-membership is an issue, but where the groups do not show an overlap. ECOWAS and SADC are completely separate clubs that meet this requirement. 
Models and Estimation
The dependent variable is total bilateral trade measured in term of exports. Xijt is total annual merchandise exports in million dollars from country i to j at time t. The use of exports as measure of bilateral trade takes into account that many importers in Africa deliberately under-report their imports in order to avoid import duties (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006) . Two models are estimated to measure the impact of multi-membership.
The first model focuses specifically on the impact of multi-membership in general.
The second model takes the differences in overlapping (multiple) membership within the blocs into consideration as we introduce interactive terms regarding RTA dummies and the multi-membership variable (mult). Equation (2) investigates the general impact of overlapping membership and here the null hypothesis in line with the mainstream literature is that its impact is insignificant or negative, because multi-membership creates red 13 tape and undermines full implementation of each international agreement.
Equation (3) enables us to investigate the impact of multi-membership in the context of ECOWAS and SADC, respectively. The alternative hypothesis is a bit more complex than those tested in the other equations. Since the underlying RTAs appear to be complementing one another in ECOWAS whereas they competing in SADC, we expect a positive impact of multiple memberships in ECOWAS and a negative impact in SADC.
In estimating the gravity model to assess the impact of RTAs on intraregional trade, there are three econometric concerns. First, we may have reverse causality between exports and RTA variables if countries that trade intensively are more likely to form RTAs (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007) . The African RTAs were, however, formed at a moment in time when intra-regional trade was still at a very low level. For example, intra-regional trade as a percentage of total trade was only 3% in 1970. In addition, membership of African RTAs is by and large determined by geographical and political factors. Therefore reverse causality is highly unlikely in our study. Second, we may have unobserved heterogeneity mainly as result of Thus, in line with these econometric concerns, we used the PPML estimator with the time and dyadic fixed effects to estimate equations (2) where and are vector of covariates and coefficients respectively.
Data
We use However, in our estimation of models, we have 12,833 total observations because of missing data. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the variables comparing the averages for the two main RTAs. Source: Authors' computation
Conclusions and Policy Implications
The main policy message is about the institutional design of RTAs. Our analysis clarifies under which conditions African 'spaghetti bowl' RTA formation is ineffective. We contrasted the ECOWAS and SADC approaches to regional integration. The ECOWAS approach provides an umbrella that embraces smaller and lower regional integration initiatives. In this approach overlapping multi-RTA membership does not provide a problem. In contrast in the SADC approach we have a hub and spokes setting of membership in competing RTAs and therefore inconsistencies that hamper the RTA's effectiveness are likely to occur (and indeed according to our estimates this actually happens to be the case).
Essentially, we therefore find a positive impact if an additional membership complements the integration process of the original RTA and this provides a clear lesson for the direction into which RTAs could be broadened and strengthened. Firstly, Africa member states should increase their commitments to the various integration processes as this is the only condition for RTAs to be effective and not being purely ceremonial. For member states to be fully committed to single RTA, the level of economic integration must be deepened: the scope and coverage of preferential schemes should be extended considerably so that members can benefit substantially from being single member of an RTA. Progressively, the various RTAs must develop modalities to coordinate activities such that the overlap and duplicative roles would considerably be reduced. The tripartite FTA launched by SADC, EAC and COMESA may be the ideal solution to overcome the challenges associated with overlapping (multi)-membership and this should be embraced by the other RTAs in order to fasten the process of continental integration. Secondly, the finding that multiple memberships could be beneficial if the RTAs complement each other also gives the impetus to African Union's effort in establishing an umbrella FTA in the form of the Continental FTA (CFTA). This CFTA should encompass the other REIs and progressively harmonise and integrate their activities, in a similar fashion as ECOWAS playing an umbrella role for the sub-REIs in Western Africa. The conclusion of the paper is consistent with the AU plan of consolidating the RTAs and eventually merging them into a single African Economic Community. Thus, this AU plan, in our opinion is a step in the right direction.
